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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a typical voting situation where a group of agents
show their preferences over a set of alternatives. Under our approach, such
preferences are codified into individual positional values which can be aggregated
in several ways through particular functions, yielding positional voting rules and
providing a social result in each case. We show that scoring rules belong to such
class of positional voting rules. But if we focus our interest on OWA operators
as aggregation functions, other well-known voting systems naturally appear. In
particular, we determine those ones verifying duplication (i.e., clone irrelevance)
and present a proposal of an overall social result provided by them.
Keywords: positional voting rules, scoring rules, aggregation functions, OWA
operators, duplication.
1. Introduction
There exists in Social Choice a long tradition controversy between the po-
sitional and non-positional approaches to voting theory, coming early from
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Borda and Condorcet, respectively. Ga¨rdenfors [26] established a comprehen-
sive framework to understand this opposition, and considered that “positionalist
voting functions are those social choice functions where the positions of the al-
ternatives in the voters’ preference orders crucially influence the social ordering
of the alternatives”. Of course, this assertion can be understood in different
ways1, being Borda, plurality and antiplurality rules the most popular cases of
positional voting rules. All of them are specific cases of scoring rules2, where
the alternatives are socially ordered taking into account the sum of individual
scores according to the agents’ preferences. In fact, from Riker [41] on, many
authors have identified scoring rules with positional voting methods. However,
as we will show, scoring rules are not exclusive in capturing positional features
of voting.
Our proposal is based on aggregation functions, mainly through OWA op-
erators3. This tool has been revealed as a unifying way to face different issues
appearing in several fields, Social Choice Theory among them (on this particular
matter, see Wang et al. [46], Llamazares [35], Garc´ıa-Lapresta et al. [21] and
Kacprzyk et al. [30], among others). As will be shown along the paper, this
approach sheds light on some aspects avoided in the scoring context4.
One of these interesting properties, not satisfied by the scoring rules, is du-
plication. This property entails irrelevance of clone voters in the final outcome
and might not seem suitable at all in voting scenarios. Nonetheless, its fulfill-
ment should be convenient in several contexts; for example, when multiple votes
are allowed for each voter (what happens if some Internet mechanisms are used)
or whenever that streams of opinion, rather than individual opinions, should be
1See Pattanaik [39], especially Section 3.
2See Chebotarev and Shamis [12] for a referenced survey on scoring rules and their char-
acterizations.
3The initials in OWA stand for ordered weighted averaging (see Yager [47], Yager and
Kacprzyk [49] and Yager et al. [50]). This kind of operators have been characterized by Fodor
et al. [19].
4This argument, supported along the present paper, already preliminarily appeared in
Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Mart´ınez-Panero [24].
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taken into account. Even more, it will be established that duplication arises in
some specific positional voting rules induced by OWA operators interestingly
related to decision under complete ignorance.
It is worth pointing out that there exist in the literature other possible al-
ternative approaches extending the framework of scoring rules, such as flexible
scoring rules introduced by Baharad and Nitzan [1]. On their hand, Xia and
Conitzer [54, 55] have proposed what they call generalized scoring rules, ex-
tending well known voting rules such as Copeland, maximin, Bucklin and, of
course, scoring rules. And recently Llamazares and Pen˜a [36, 37] have employed
cumulative standing functions representing in an interesting comprehensive way
scoring rules such as plurality, antiplurality, Borda rule, k-approval voting, etc.
Even more, these last authors also include in their proposal other voting rules
based on variable scoring vectors or taking into account the support behind the
candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
basic notation for the voters’ preferences over the alternatives and their related
positions. Section 3 is devoted to voting rules as aggregation functions; we
show that scoring rules are specific cases of such positional rules, and then we
focus our attention on OWA operators and show their connections with some
well-known voting rules appearing in the literature. The need of taking into
account a variable electorate leads us to use extended OWA operators (EOWA
operators) and, with this background, in Section 4 we define duplication and
then we characterize those OWA-generated positional voting rules satisfying
this property. An illustrative example is also presented, and a proposal of an
overall social order based on the characterized rules is obtained in a unifying
way. Finally, some concluding remarks are included in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
Consider a set of voters V = {1, . . . ,m}, with m ≥ 2 (occasionally, just for
completion reasons, we will also consider the trivial case m = 1). These voters
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show their preferences on a set of alternatives X = {x1, . . . , xn}, with n ≥ 2.
With L(X) we denote the set of linear orders on X, and with W (X) the set
of weak orders (or complete preorders) on X. Given R, <∈ W (X), with 
and ∼ we denote the asymmetric and the symmetric parts of R, respectively.
A profile is a vector R = (R1, . . . , Rm) of weak orders, where Rv represents the
preferences of the voter v ∈ V . Vectors in Rn are denoted as a = (a1, . . . , an).
Given a, b ∈ Rn, with a ≤ b we mean ai ≤ bi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 1. Given R ∈W (X), the position of alternative xi ∈ X is defined
as
p(xi) = n−# {xj ∈ X | xi  xj} − 1
2
# {xj ∈ (X \ {xi}) | xj ∼ xi} . (1)
It is worth mentioning that this proposal of assessing positions to the alter-
natives is equivalent to the way of scoring in extended versions of the Borda
count for weak orders, where the scores of the tied alternatives are obtained as
the average of the corresponding ones after a linearization process (see Smith
[42], Black [8] and Cook and Seiford [14]).
Example 1. Consider R ∈W ({x1, . . . , x7}) given by
R
x7
x3 x4
x2
x1 x5 x6
Then,
p(x1) = p(x5) = p(x6) =
5 + 6 + 7
3
= 6 = 7− 0− 1
2
2,
p(x2) = 4 = 7− 3− 1
2
0,
p(x3) = p(x4) =
2 + 3
2
= 2.5 = 7− 4− 1
2
1,
p(x7) = 1 = 7− 6− 1
2
0.
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Consequently, R is codified by the positions vector
(p(x1), p(x2), p(x3), p(x4), p(x5), p(x6), p(x7)) = (6, 4, 2.5, 2.5, 6, 6, 1).
In the particular case of linear orders, positions for each alternative vary from
1 to n with step 1 and the coordinates of each positions vector are permutations
of Pl = {1, 2, . . . , n}. In the general case of weak orders, it is easy to check that
possible positions range from 1 to n with step 0.5, i.e., in this case the positional
vectors take their coordinates in
P = {1 + λ · 0.5 | λ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2(n− 1)}} = {1, 1.5, 2, . . . , n− 0.5, n},
although not all n-dimensional vectors with these values as coordinates do rep-
resent a weak order5.
Taking into account the positions of the alternatives, every profile R ∈
W (X)m has associated a position matrix containing the positions of the alter-
natives for all the voters
p1(x1) p1(x2) · · · p1(xn)
p2(x1) p2(x2) · · · p2(xn)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
pm(x1) pm(x2) · · · pm(xn)
 ,
where pv(xi) is the position of xi for voter v. Thus, row v contains the positions
of the alternatives according to voter v, and column i contains the positions of
the alternative xi.
3. The aggregation process
Definition 2. Given a domain D ⊆W (X)m, a voting rule on D is a mapping
F : D −→W (X) that satisfies the following conditions:
5The set of of all admisible positions vectors in the previous sense has been characterized
by Garc´ıa-Lapresta and Pe´rez-Roma´n [25].
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1. Anonymity: For every permutation pi on {1, . . . ,m} and every profile
R ∈ D,
F
(
Rpi(1), . . . , Rpi(m)
)
= F (R1, . . . , Rm) .
2. Neutrality: For every permutation σ on {1, . . . , n} and every profile R ∈
D,
F (Rσ1 , . . . , R
σ
m) = (F (R1, . . . , Rm))
σ
,
where Rσv and (F (R1, . . . , Rm))
σ
are the orders obtained from Rv and
F (R1, . . . , Rm), respectively, by relabeling the alternatives according to σ,
i.e., xσ(i)R
σ
v xσ(j) ⇔ xiRv xj and xσ(i) (F (R1, . . . , Rm))σ xσ(j) ⇔
xi F (R1, . . . , Rm)xj.
3. Unanimity: For every profile R ∈ D and all xi, xj ∈ X,
(∀v ∈ V xiRv xj) ⇒ xi F (R )xj .
Anonymity means a symmetric consideration for the voters; neutrality means
a symmetric consideration for the alternatives; and unanimity means that if all
the individuals consider an alternative as good as another one, then the social
preference coincides with the individual preferences on this issue.
The previous framework considering voting rules, where the outcome is a
social order (as in Smith [42]), is not unique at all in Social Choice Theory.
Other possible approaches can be taken into account, such as social choice cor-
respondences, where the result is the (nonempty) subset of the best alternatives
(as in Young [52, 53]; see also Laslier [31] for further rank-based and pairwise-
based approaches), or even social choice functions, where a single alternative is
assigned to each profile6.
3.1. Aggregation functions
In our proposal, we have adapted the notion of aggregation function from
[0, 1]m to m-tuples of [1,∞)m. In fact, for our purposes, it suffices to deal
6As pointed out by Courtin et al. [15], differences in the axiomatic treatment arise de-
pending on the type of social mechanism considered.
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with more restricted domains, namely, Pm = {1, 1.5, 2, . . . , n − 0.5, n}m or
Pml = {1, 2, . . . , n}m. On aggregation functions in the standard unit interval,
see Calvo et al. [10], Beliakov et al. [7, 6] and Grabisch et al. [27].
Definition 3. Let D be a domain being D = Pm or D = Pml . An aggregation
function on D is a mapping A : D −→ R verifying the following conditions:
1. Boundary conditions: A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 and A(n, . . . , n) = n.
2. Monotonicity: a ≤ b ⇒ A(a) ≤ A(b), for all a, b ∈ D.
If, additionally, A satisfies idempotency, i.e., A(a, . . . , a) = a for every a ∈ P
(resp. a ∈ Pl), then A is called averaging aggregation function.
It is easy to see that averaging aggregation functions satisfy compensative-
ness:
min{a1, . . . , am} ≤ A(a1, . . . , am) ≤ max{a1, . . . , am},
for every (a1, . . . , am) ∈ D.
Typical averaging aggregation functions are the arithmetic mean, trimmed
means, the median, the maximum, the minimum, etc. In fact, we can gather all
these aggregation functions as specific cases of OWA operators.
Definition 4. A weighting vector of dimension m is a vector w = (w1, . . . , wm) ∈
[0, 1]m such that
m∑
i=1
wi = 1.
Definition 5. Given D = Pm or D = Pml and a weighting vector w of
dimension m, the OWA operator on D associated with w is the mapping Aw :
D −→ R defined as
Aw(a1, . . . , am) =
m∑
i=1
wi · a[i],
where a[i] is the i-th greatest number of a1, . . . , am.
As noted before, some well-known aggregation functions are specific cases of
OWA operators.
With appropriate weighting vectors w = (w1, . . . , wm) we obtain
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1. The maximum, for w = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
2. The minimum, for w = (0, . . . , 0, 1).
3. The arithmetic mean, for w =
(
1
m , . . . ,
1
m
)
.
4. The k-trimmed means:
• If k = 1, w =
(
0, 1m−2 , . . . ,
1
m−2 , 0
)
.
• If k = 2, w =
(
0, 0, 1m−4 , . . . ,
1
m−4 , 0, 0
)
.
• . . . .
5. The median:
(a) If m is odd, wi =
 1, if i =
m+1
2 ,
0, otherwise.
(b) If m is even, wi =

1
2 , if i ∈ {m2 , m2 + 1},
0, otherwise.
6. The mid-range, for w = (0.5, 0, . . . , 0, 0.5).
For m = 3, the set of weighting vectors
{(α, β, 1− α− β) | 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 , α+ β ≤ 1}
can be identified with the triangle {(α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2 | α+ β ≤ 1} (see Figure 1).
(0, 0)
min
(1, 0)
max
(0, 1)
median
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)mean
α
β
Figure 1: The main OWA operators for m = 3.
Note that the vertices of the triangle, (0, 0), (1, 0) and (0, 1), correspond to
the minimum, the maximum and the median, respectively; and the baricenter
of the triangle,
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, corresponds to the arithmetic mean.
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3.2. Positional voting rules
Definition 6. Given the aggregation function A : Pm −→ R and a profile
R ∈W (X)m, the aggregated position of the alternative xi ∈ X is defined as
pA(xi) = A(p1(xi), . . . , pm(xi)),
where pv(xi) is the position of xi for voter v ∈ V .
For every aggregation function A : Pm −→ R, we consider the mapping
FA : W (X)
m −→W (X) defined as FA(R) = <A, where
xi <A xj ⇔ pA(xi) ≤ pA(xj).
Remark 1. In the previous situation, it is easy to check that FA is a voting
rule.
Definition 7. For every aggregation function A : Pm −→ R, FA is the posi-
tional voting rule associated with A.
3.2.1. Scoring rules as positional voting rules
As pointed out before, scoring rules appear to be the paradigm of the posi-
tional approach to voting theory. In what follows we define this class of rules,
which encloses well-known voting rules such as plurality, antiplurality and Borda
rules, among others. Then, we will show that all of them are positional voting
rules in the aforementioned sense, but it will be shown that the reverse is not
true.
Definition 8. A scoring vector of dimension n ∈ N is a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
Rn such that s1 ≥ · · · ≥ sn and s1 > sn.
Now, suppose that voters’ preferences over the alternatives are linear orders
(i.e., weak orders where ties among distinct alternatives are avoided), gathered
in a profile R ∈ L(X)m . Given a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sn), for each voter,
s1 points are assigned to the top-ranked alternative, s2 points to the second-
ranked alternative, and so on. Formally, in terms of positions, the individual
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score of voter v ∈ V for the alternative xi is rvs(xi) = spv(xi). The collective
score for the alternative xi is rs(xi) =
m∑
v=1
rvs(xi). The alternative(s) with the
largest total score is (are) the winner(s).
Definition 9. Given a scoring vector s of dimension n, the scoring rule asso-
ciated with s is the mapping Fs : L(X)
m −→W (X) defined as Fs(R) = <s ,
where xi <s xj ⇔ rs(xi) ≥ rs(xj).
Remark 2. It is straightforward to check that Fs is a voting rule for every
scoring vector s. In what follows, notice that when dealing with positional
voting rules, the smallest value(s) correspond(s) to the best position(s), just the
opposite happening with scoring rules, where the highest score determines the
winner(s).
The following cases give the scoring rules associated with various voting rules
appearing in the literature.
• k–approval voting7, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}: s = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0), with k
1’s. As important specific cases of this, we have
– Plurality: for k = 1, s = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
– Antiplurality: for k = n− 1, s = (1, . . . , 1, 0).
• Borda rule: s = (n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1, 0).
• Best-worst voting rules8: s = (1, s, . . . , s, 0), with s ∈ (0, 1).
Note that the excluded cases s = 0 and s = 1 would correspond again
to plurality and antiplurality, respectively.
7Notice that while k–approval voting is a scoring rule, approval voting (where each voter
can approve of as many alternatives as wished) is not. However, it can be understood as a
flexible scoring rule following the extended framework proposed by Baharad and Nitzan [1].
8Best-worst voting rules were introduced and axiomatically characterized in the scoring
context by Garc´ıa-Lapresta et al. [22].
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Given the scoring rule associated with the scoring vector (s1, . . . , sn), a, b ∈
R such that a > 0, the new scoring rule associated with the scoring vector
(s′1, . . . , s
′
n), where s
′
i = asi + b for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is equivalent to the
previous one, in the sense that they provide the same social outcomes. In this
way, every scoring vector (s1, . . . , sn) can be normalized, i.e., it is equivalent to
(s′1, . . . , s
′
n) with s
′
1 = 1 and s
′
n = 0, by simply taking s
′
i = (si− sn)/(s1− sn).
For n = 4, the set of normalized scoring vectors {(1, s, t, 0) | 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ 1}
can be identified with the triangle {(s, t) ∈ [0, 1]2 | t ≤ s} (see Garc´ıa-Lapresta
et al. [20]). As shown in Figure 2, the vertices of the triangle, (0, 0), (1, 0) and
(1, 1), correspond to plurality, 2–approval voting and antiplurality, respectively;
the baricenter of the triangle,
(
2
3 ,
1
3
)
, corresponds to the Borda rule; and the
segment conecting (0, 0) and (1, 1) corresponds to the set of best-worst voting
rules.
(0, 0)
Plurality
(1, 0)
2–approval voting
(1, 1)
Antiplurality
(
2
3 ,
1
3
)Borda
(s, s)
Best-worst
s
t
Figure 2: The best-known scoring rules for n = 4.
The next result shows how to construct an aggregation function from any
scoring vector so that their associated positional voting rule and the correspond-
ing scoring rule are the same.
Proposition 1. All the scoring rules are positional voting rules.
Proof: Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ [0, 1]n be a normalized scoring vector, i.e.,
1 = s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sn−1 ≥ sn = 0. Let As : Pml −→ R be the mapping
defined as
As(a1, . . . , am) = 1 +
n− 1
m
m∑
v=1
ϕs(av),
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with ϕs(i) = 1 − si for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It is easy to see that As is an
aggregation function on Pml .
We also have
xi <As xj ⇔ pAs(xi) ≤ pAs(xj) ⇔
As(p1(xi), . . . , pm(xi)) ≤ As(p1(xj), . . . , pm(xj)) ⇔
1 +
n− 1
m
m∑
v=1
ϕs(pv(xi)) ≤ 1 + n− 1
m
m∑
v=1
ϕs(pv(xj)) ⇔
rs(xi) =
m∑
v=1
rvs(xi) ≥
m∑
v=1
rvs(xj) = rs(xj) ⇔ xi <s xj .
Hence, <As = <s and, consequently, the scoring rule associated with s
coincides with the positional voting rule associated with As.
Now we will show that our positional approach actually does extend the
scoring context. We mean that, although sharing similar patterns, it is not true
that every positional voting rule associated with an aggregation function can
be represented by a scoring rule (in the sense that both provide the same social
order).
Example 2. Consider the profile given by
R1
x1
x3
x2
R2
x1
x3
x2
R3
x2
x3
x1
where the associated position matrix is
1 3 2
1 3 2
3 1 2
 .
Aggregating through the maximum (A = max), i.e., under the maximin voting
rule, the following social order is obtained: x3 A x1 ∼A x2. Let now consider
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a generic scoring rule with associated (normalized) scoring vector s = (1, s, 0),
0 ≤ s ≤ 1. Then, the collective scores obtained for the alternatives are
rs(x1) = 2, rs(x2) = 1, rs(x3) = 3s.
According to the results, every scoring rule provides x1 s x2. In any case,
none of them represents the positional voting rule associated with the maximum,
where x1 ∼A x2, as pointed out before. Consequently, the class of positional
voting rules does not coincide with the class of scoring rules.
Remark 3. Notice an interesting feature of the maximin rule that can be ob-
served in the above situation: A kind of clone irrelevance, i.e., the influence
of voter’s copies is irrelevant in the final outcome. Thus, in Example 2, the
presence or absence of voter 2 (a clone of voter 1) does not affect the result.
This is a determinant fact for excluding the maximin voting rule from scoring
rules, because it is against Young’s [53] continuity9, an axiom appearing in his
characterization of scoring rules.
3.2.2. OWA-generated positional voting rules
Taking into account some of the OWA operators mentioned above, we obtain
positional voting rules which are connected to (or even replicate) well-known
procedures appearing in the literature:
• The arithmetic mean as aggregation function induces the Borda rule.
And it is worth mentioning that the arithmetic mean is also the basis for
the Range Voting method (Smith [43]), in a decisional context where the
alternatives receive numerical assessments one by one.
• The median instead of the arithmetic mean, and linguistic terms instead
of numerical values, are used in the Majority Judgment voting system in-
9This is an archimedean-type property which states that if two disjoint sets of voters U
and V select x and y as winners, respectively, then x should be a winner for the superset
(nU)∪ V for n sufficiently large, where (nU) means n copies of those voters and their votes.
Clearly, as exposed, this is not fulfilled by the maximin voting rule.
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troduced by Balinski and Laraki [3, 4]. Extensions of this procedure using
centered OWA operators (Yager [48]) and distances appear in Garc´ıa-
Lapresta and Mart´ınez-Panero [23] and in Falco´ and Garc´ıa-Lapresta [17],
respectively. Again, in a different scenario, Bucklin’s method selects the
candidates with highest median ranking as winners (see Tideman [44] and
Felsenthal [18]), and similarly Basset and Persky [5] also proposed to se-
lect the alternative with best median evaluation (see also Laslier [33], who
has coined the term maxmed for this voting scheme).
• The maximum leads to a voting rule in which each alternative is evalu-
ated according to the worst reached position. Those with the best assigned
value are then elected. Such a maximin voting rule, which advocates the
maximin principle of normative economics10, is called fallback bargaining11
by Brams and Kilgour [9]. It has been characterized in the voting context
by Congar and Merlin [13] (see also Llamazares and Pen˜a [36]).
The same underlying idea appears in the leximin voting system proposed
by Laslier [32] (see also Laslier [33]), and in the Simpson-Kramer method
(see Levin and Nalebuff [34]), although in different decisional frameworks.
Furthermore, the procedure obtained through the maximum as aggrega-
tion operator is also related to the Coombs method (where the alternative
with the largest number of last positions is sequentially withdrawn), as
well as to the antiplurality rule (see Baharad and Nitzan [2] and Congar
and Merlin [13]).
• The minimum entails a voting rule called maximax 12 by Congar and
10Rawls [40, p. 328]: “the basic structure is perfectly just when the prospects of the least
fortunate are as great as they can be”.
11Concretely, the maximin rule corresponds to the case of fallback bargaining with unanim-
ity, also called Kant-Rawls social compromise after Hurwicz and Sertel [29].
12The apparent discordance leading the maximum to the maximin voting rule, as well as
the minimum to the maximax, relies on our positional approach where, contrary to the scoring
context, the smallest value is associated with the best position, as pointed out before. It is
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Merlin [13], also characterized by them. Its conception is similar to that
of the Hare rule, also known as alternative vote (where the alternative with
the fewest first positions is sequentially withdrawn). It is also related to
the most used (and criticized) voting system: plurality rule (see Laslier
[32] and Congar and Merlin [13]).
• The mid-range is related to the basic 1-best-1-worst voting rule (see
Garc´ıa-Lapresta et al. [22]).
Remark 4. There can exist a unique “translation” between weighting vectors
and normalizated scoring vectors. This is what happens with the Borda rule:
as a scoring rule, it is associated with
(
1, n−2n−1 , . . . ,
1
n−11, 0
)
, while as OWA-
generated positional voting rule corresponds to
(
1
m , . . . ,
1
m
)
. However, in some
cases such translation does not exist (see Remark 3, where it is shown that
maximin rule can not be captured through any scoring rule; and it is also
true for the maximax rule). Even more, depending on the situation, there can
be several possibilities of translation from the same scoring rule into OWA-
generated positional voting rules, being not compatible among them. This fact
is shown in what follows.
Consider the profile given by
R1
x1
x3
x2
R2
x2
x3
x1
R3
x3
x2
x1
The result under plurality rule is x1 ∼ x2 ∼ x3, and it is easy to check that
this social order is also the same under the OWA-generated positional voting
rule associated with the weighting vector (0, 0, 1), i.e., the maximax rule.
On the other hand, consider the new profile
also worth to note in what follows that in the scoring context there are as many scores as
alternatives, whereas in the positional scenario, when dealing with OWA operators, there are
as many weights as voters.
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R1
x1
x2
x3
R2
x1
x3
x2
R3
x2
x3
x1
Now plurality rule gives x1  x2  x3 and, after some computation, the
same social order can be obtained through every OWA-generated positional
voting rule associated with any weighting vector (α, β, 1 − α − β) such that
β > 0.
Thus, these two profiles show that, even when existing weights associated
with scores, they could have not common values. Concretely, in words referred to
our example, being the first weighting vector incompatible with those obtained
to capture plurality in the second profile, it can be argued that there not exists
“the” OWA-generated positional voting rule associated with plurality (similar
reasons for the antiplurality rule also stand).
Remark 5. One can ask if OWA-generated positional voting rules which are
not scoring rules are those considering in the aggregation process only the in-
formation about the best and/or worst positioned alternatives, as happening
with maximin and maximax rules. The answer is no. In both of the profiles
appearing in Remark 4, the maxmed rule (whose weighting vector is (0, 1, 0))
cannot be represented under any scoring rule. For example, in the first pro-
file, under a normalized scoring vector (1, s, 0) with s ∈ [0, 1], the obtained
social order is x1 ∼ x2 ∼ x3 when s = 0 (plurality, as aforementioned) and
x3  x2  x1 when s > 0. However, if maxmed were applied, then the result
would be x3 ∼ x2  x1, incompatible with any of these scoring rules.
3.3. Extended notions
Sometimes it is necessary to take into account a variable electorate (for
instance, as mentioned, to deal with the clonation or appearance of new voters,
as happening in Example 2). This is the reason why we introduce some extended
notions of those already defined throughout the paper.
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Definition 10. An extended voting rule is a mapping
F˜ :
⋃
m∈N
W (X)m −→W (X)
such that Fm = F˜ |W (X)m is a voting rule for each dimension m = 2, 3, . . . ,
and F1(R) = R.
Definition 11. An extended OWA operator (EOWA) is a sequence of OWA
operators A˜ = (Awm)m∈N with associated weighting vectors w
m = (wm1 , . . . , w
m
m),
one for each dimension m ∈ N.
Following Calvo and Mayor [11] and Mayor and Calvo [38] (see also Beliakov
et al. [7, pp. 54-56]) and Beliakov et al. [6, pp. 73-76]), we can show graphically
an EOWA operator as a weighting triangle where the entries in each row add
up to one.
w11
w21 w
2
2
w31 w
3
2 w
3
3
w41 w
4
2 w
4
3 w
4
4
w51 w
5
2 w
5
3 w
5
4 w
5
5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Duplication
Here we formally introduce the aforementioned clone irrelevance property
which, broadly speaking, requires that new voters replicating the same prefer-
ences of already existing voters will not affect the social outcome. At first sight
such statement might seem a vulneration of the very essence of democracy, but
it can make sense in some contexts. For example, in bargaining, when the above
mentioned fallback method is used to find a compromise among the bargainers
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because they “fall back in lockstep to less and less preferred positions until they
agree on outcome” (see Brams and Kilgour [9]). But it also make sense in voting
scenarios such as the Internet, where agents can cast their votes more than one
time13; or wherever that, rather than merely the total amount of votes, different
currents of opinion or electoral bodies (such as minorities) should be taken into
account.
This property appears as duplication in Congar and Merlin [13], where they
consider this axiom in order to capture situations of complete ignorance in some
voting contexts (see references therein) and characterize the maximin procedure.
Definition 12. An extended voting rule F˜ satisfies duplication if
Fm+1(R, Ri) = Fm(R),
for every profile R = (R1, . . . , Ri, . . . , Rm) ∈W (X)m and every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
4.1. A characterization result
It is interesting to find those procedures satisfying duplication, and the fol-
lowing result shows the answer for positional voting rules associated with EOWA
operators.
Theorem 1. Given an EOWA operator A˜ = (Awm)m∈N , the extended voting
rule F˜A˜ satisfies duplication if and only if A˜ is a rational convex combination of
the maximum and the minimum EOWA operators, i.e., there exists α ∈ [0, 1]∩Q
such that wm = α(1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− α)(0, . . . , 0, 1) for every m ∈ N.
Proof: It is straightforward that positional voting rules associated with Awm ,
where wm = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (i.e., maximin), wm = (0, 0, . . . , 1) (i.e., maximax),
13See Yokoo and Matsubara [51], where they analyze the effect of false name bids in Internet
auctions as well as Wagman and Conitzer [45], where these authors deal with false-name-proof
voting mechanisms, i.e., those where no agent benefits from participating more than once.
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and convex combinations of them, wm = (α, 0, . . . , 0, 1 − α), with α ∈ [0, 1],
satisfy duplication14.
For the reciprocal, we first prove that if duplication holds for an extended
voting rule F˜A˜, where A˜ = (Awm)m∈N , then all intermediate weights in each
dimension m, w2, . . . , wm−1, should be zero. Our reasoning will deal with a
profile consisting in all circular permutations15 of three alternatives, but the
argument is extensible to m > 3. Thus, consider the profile
R1
x1
x2
x3
R2
x2
x3
x1
R3
x3
x1
x2
where the associated position matrix is
1 2 3
3 1 2
2 3 1
 .
As every alternative occupies each position exactly once, a global tie arises
and the aggregated position for each is pA(xi) = 3w
3
1 + 2w
3
2 + w
3
3, i = 1, 2, 3,
so that x1 ∼Aw3 x2 ∼Aw3 x3, where w
3 = (w31, w
3
2, w
3
3).
Now suppose that voter 1 is replicated, becoming the new situation
R1
x1
x2
x3
R2
x2
x3
x1
R3
x3
x1
x2
R4 = R1
x1
x2
x3
14Notice that, in the previous argument, α does not need to be rational. However, as
pointed out by Fagin and Wimmers [16] “in some situations we have to restrict our attention
to rational weights”. One of these situations naturally arises when “we simply allow multiple
copies of voters”, which is exactly our case.
15These circular permutations yield a Condorcet cycle.
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where the new associated position matrix is
1 2 3
3 1 2
2 3 1
1 2 3
 .
Then, the aggregated positions for each alternative are
pA(x1) = 3w
4
1 + 2w
4
2 + w
4
3 + w
4
4,
pA(x2) = 3w
4
1 + 2w
4
2 + 2w
4
3 + w
4
4,
pA(x3) = 3w
4
1 + 3w
4
2 + 2w
4
3 + w
4
4.
Taking into account duplication, the tie among all three alternatives holds;
hence
x1 ∼A x2 ⇔ w43 = 0,
x1 ∼A x3 ⇔ w42 + w43 = 0,
x1 ∼A x3 ⇔ w42 = 0.
Then, w42 = w
4
3 = 0. Once proven that central weights are null (this fact
will be taken into account in what follows), what remains is to show that lateral
weights in each side of the triangle should the same at any level, i.e., there exists
α ∈ [0, 1] such that wm1 = α and wmm = 1 − α, for every m ≥ 2. To do this,
consider α = pq with p, q ∈ N and p < q, expressed as an irreductible fraction,
and any profile with m voters and q+ 1 alternatives where the alternative x1 is
at least the best for one voter and the worst for another one, while x2 occupies
the position p+ 1 for all of them. A sketch of such ad hoc profile would be
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position
1
· · ·
p+ 1
· · ·
q + 1
R1
· · ·
· · ·
x2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
x2
· · ·
· · ·
Ri
x1
· · ·
x2
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
x2
· · ·
· · ·
Rj
· · ·
· · ·
x2
· · ·
x1
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
x2
· · ·
· · ·
Rm
· · ·
· · ·
x2
· · ·
· · ·
The aggregated positions for the selected alternatives would be
pA(x1) =
p
q
(q + 1) +
(
1− p
q
)
= p+ 1,
pA(x2) =
p
q
(p+ 1) +
(
1− p
q
)
(p+ 1) = p+ 1,
so that x1 ∼A x2, being A the voting rule corresponding to any EOWA with
such weights.
But now, if we replicate any subset of voters becoming the new weights
β 6= α and hence 1− β 6= 1− α, then the new aggregated positions would be
pA(x1) = β(q + 1) + (1− β) 6= p+ 1,
pA(x2) = β(p+ 1) + (1− β)(p+ 1) = p+ 1,
so that x1 ∼A x2 does not hold. Hence, if lateral weights change from one
dimension to another, duplication fails.
In conclusion, under duplication we obtain the class of weighting triangles
1
α 1− α
α 0 1− α
α 0 0 1− α
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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As specific cases we have:
• α = 1: maximum (maximin rule),
• α = 0: minimum (maximax rule),
• α = 0.5: mid-range.
It is worth mentioning that duplication is related to the Hurwicz criterion
[28] used in decision making under complete uncertainty, where the value of
a decision is a convex combination of its lowest possible expected value (pes-
simistic assessment) and of its highest one (optimistic assessment). On the other
hand, although duplication might seem to be antidemocratic, Congar and Mer-
lin [13] show that at least it is compatible with the basic democratic principle
of anonymity and advocate it as a way “to protect the opinion of a minority
against the will of the majority”.
4.2. An illustrative example
Consider three voters that arrange three alternatives according to the fol-
lowing profile
R1
x2
x3
x1
R2
x2 x3
x1
R3
x1 x3
x2
with associated position matrix
3 1 2
3 1.5 1.5
1.5 3 1.5
 .
If we choose the OWA operator Aw(α) associated with the weighting vec-
tor w(α) = (α, 0, 1 − α), with α ∈ [0, 1], then the corresponding aggregated
positions for the alternatives would be
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pAw(α)(x1) = 3α+ 1.5 (1− α) = 1.5α+ 1.5,
pAw(α)(x2) = 3α+ 1 (1− α) = 2α+ 1,
pAw(α)(x3) = 2α+ 1.5 (1− α) = 0.5α+ 1.5.
According to the possible values of α, the corresponding social orders are
the following
α = 0 0 < α < 13 α =
1
3
1
3 < α < 1 α = 1
x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3
x1 x3 x3 x1 x2 x1 x2
x1 x1
As one could expect, different social orders appear depending on α.
In the following subsection we propose an integrating method to obtain a
unified result for each alternative taking into account the different outcomes
when α ranges from 0 to 1.
4.3. Overall positions and social order
For the general case with n alternatives and using in a first stage the po-
sitional voting rule associated with the OWA operator of weighting vector
w(α) = (α, 0, . . . , 0, 1 − α), it is possible to assign the corresponding social
position pAw(α)(xi) to the alternative xi. Thus, we can introduce the function
µi : [0, 1] −→ R defined as µi(α) = pAw(α)(xi). Such function is always a degree
one polynomial (a linear function), and hence Riemann integrable. This fact
allows us to define the overall position of xi as
p(xi) =
∫ 1
0
µi(α) dα.
Easy computations lead to the following results in the previous example:
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p(x1) =
∫ 1
0
µ1(α) dα =
∫ 1
0
(1.5α+ 1.5) dα = 9/4,
p(x2) =
∫ 1
0
µ2(α) dα =
∫ 1
0
(2α+ 1) dα = 2,
p(x3) =
∫ 1
0
µ3(α) dα =
∫ 1
0
(0.5α+ 1.5) dα = 7/4.
Thus, the overall social order is x3  x2  x1.
In conclusion, for each α ∈ [0, 1] the corresponding positional voting rule
associated with Aw(α) only takes into account the best and worst positions for
each alternative, yielding different social orders in each case. However, the pos-
sible criticism on the influence of the choice of α in the result can be mitigated
under this overall approach, where a social order is obtained not correspond-
ing with any predetermined α, but amalgamating all allowable values for this
parameter.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a general framework for positional voting
rules which includes all scoring rules as especial cases. To this aim, we need an
aggregation process for obtaining a collective position from individual ones for
each alternative. This is the reason why we have mainly used OWA operators,
as they provide a comprehensive way to deal with this kind of information.
More concretely, we have analyzed how the maximum and the minimum OWA
operators induce the so called maximin and maximax voting rules, respectively,
recently characterized by Congar and Merlin [13]. Of course, these rules are
not scoring rules (they satisfy duplication, a property radically opposed to the
continuity verified by the scoring rules) although all of them share interesting
features due to their positional nature. A comprehensive diagram showing our
knowledge of the logical relationship among these rules appears in Figure 3.
We have focused on the duplication property appearing in the above men-
tioned characterization. On our part, once introduced suitable extended notions
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Figure 3: Relationship among positional voting rules
to take into account a variable electorate, we have characterized all EOWA-
generated positional voting rules satisfying that property.
Some questions remain unanswered. As proven in Prop. 1, all scoring rules
are positional voting rules. Even more, some scoring rules are positional voting
rules generated by OWA operators. This is the case of the Borda rule, associated
with the arithmetic mean. However, a characterization of the family of scoring
rules that are generated by OWA operators (in other words, the relationship
among scores and weights) is to be found. Additionally, families of aggregation
functions other than OWA operators, such as quasiarithmetic means, could be
also taken into account.
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